Power and politics in water governance: Revisiting the role of collective action in the commons

Abstract

© 2017 selection and editorial matter, D. Suhardiman, A. Nicol and E. Mapedza; individual chapters, the authors. Garrett Hardin’s influential article “The tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968) put institutions (or the apparent lack thereof) at the center of academic and policy debates on the management of common pool resources (Wade, 1987; Ostrom, 1990, 2000; Agrawal, 2001; Andersson and Ostrom, 2008). Ostrom et al. (1994: 3) define common pool resources as “natural or humanly constructed systems that generate a finite flow of benefits, in which: 1) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and institutional means is especially costly; and 2) exploitation by one user reduces resources availability for others.” The latter characteristic is often referred to as “subtractability” or the “zero-sum principle.”