### List of appendices

### Appendix-3.1 Social capital measurement questionnaires

1. Networks
1.1. If you suddenly needed a small amount of money how many people beyond your
immediate household and neighborhood would be willing to provide this money?
(Question used to estimate bridging networks)
$\square$ No one $\square$ One or two people $\square$ Three or four people $\square$ Five or more
people □ Any one
1.2. How many times did you go to friends/ villagers home to sit together during last month?
$\square$ Did not go $\square$ 2-3 times $\square$ 4-5 times $\square$ 5-10 times $\square$ very frequently
1.3. How many of your neighbors/ outsiders visited in your home during last month?
$\square$ No one $\square$ 2-3 time's $\square$ 4-5 times $\square$ 5-10 times $\square$ Very frequently
1.4. To what extent do you agree with the statement? "Most of the people in this
neighborhood go each others home in leisure time to sit together and discuss
individual and common problems". ( Question used to estimate neighborhood
a bonding)
□Very strongly agree □Strongly agree □Neutral □ Disagree □Strongly
y disagreet by Chiang Mai University
1.5. To what extent do you agree with the statement? "Community has better linkage
with governmental officials, private services, leaders and others outside the
community and gets support when they need". (Question used to estimate linking
networks)

□Very strongly agree □ Strongly agree □Neutral□ Disagree □Strongly
disagree
2. Trust
2.1. In general speaking how many people in the community could be trusted?
(Question used to estimate thin trust)
$\Box$ All the people with some exceptions $\Box$ More than half of the people $\Box$ Half
of the people □ Very few people
2.2. Generally in your opinion one have to be deal with villagers
$\square$ Confidently without any doubt $\square$ Be careful to some extent $\square$ Be careful to
large extent □ Be very careful
2.3. Out of the following two alternatives which one you prefer to choose?
$\Box$ 25 ropni of land with one other villager (not close relative) $\Box$ 10 ropni of land
alone
2.4. Suppose you have some money that you can lend to your neighbor or villagers. If
one villager outside your close relatives and clans came to you to borrow money what you will do?
☐You will give certainly without asking any detail ☐You will try to understand
the problem that he is facing \( \subseteq \text{You will ask for some collateral } \subseteq \text{You will tell} \)
you do not have this time
2.5. Suppose you need some money due to some emergency. How do you feel to get
that amount of money outside your close relatives? ( question used to estimate
thick trust) ghts reserved
☐You can find easily ☐You have to go close friends ☐You need some collateral
☐ Difficult to find

2.6. How much do you trust in different types of people? On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means very small extent and 5 means very great extent, how much do you trust the people in that category?

Daamlag astagamy	Trust rating								
Peoples category	1	2	3	4	5				
People from your own caste									
People from other caste									
Traders			0//						
Government officials				21/12					
Teachers									
Leaders				9					
Strangers									
Priests	J)								
Relatives									
Parents	3			900					
Brothers and sisters	17			5777					

To a very small extent -1,To a small extent -2, Neither small nor great -3, To a great extent -4, To a very great extent -5

#### 3. Collective action and cooperation

3.1	Altogether how many times in the past twelve months did you or any one else in your household participate in community activities?
	□ No □ 1-2 times □ 3-4 times □ Five times □ More than five times
3.2	If there was a water supply problem in the community, to what extent people will cooperate to try to solve the problem?
	□Very likely□ Some what likely □Some what unlikely □Very unlikely
3.3	Suppose there is difficulty with some people in neighborhood how likely is it that people in the community would get together to help them? (Question used to estimate general cooperation)
	☐ Very likely☐ Some what likely ☐ Neither likely or unlikely☐ Some what
	unlikely□ Very unlikely

3.4. If you suddenly had to go away for a day or two could your neighbors to take care of your children and livestock?

☐ Definitely ☐ Probably ☐ Probably not ☐ Definitely not
4. Social Norms
4.1. Suppose some children of the village tend to stray from the correct path, for example they are disrespectful to elders; disobey their parents, mischievous etc. Who in this village feels it right to correct other peoples children? (Question used to estimate the General ethical norms in community)
All the villagers $\square$ Relatives and neighbors $\square$ Close relatives $\square$ only their
parents
4.2. One villager faced the emergency problem of loss of bullock in cropping season
how people think his problem?
☐ His own problem and he has to solve ☐ Problem of his family and clans ☐
Problem of relatives  Problem of all villagers
4.3. One villager from your village saw some people are thieving fruits from a villager's fruit tree. In such case what he will do?
$\square$ He will tell them not to do so $\square$ He will tell the owner immediately $\square$ He will
tell the owner later $\square$ He will not care
4.4. If a community project does not benefit directly to you but has benefits for many others in the village/neighborhood, would you contribute time or money to the project?
☐You will feel happy to contribute time and money ☐That depends on the
relation with those villagers   You will contribute but not with happiness  You will try to avoid
4.5. How do your family members join religious functions in the community?
$\square$ With enthusiasm $\square$ As social norms $\square$ Only to respect god $\square$ Do not like to
join

4.6. Social norms are ever changing, in your perception how the social norms are
being changed since last ten years.
□Good social norms are increasing □Good social norms are decreasing □ Bad
norms are increasing   No change
5. Reciprocity
5.1. In social ceremonies people need many things to accomplish and in such
ceremonies / events how do the villagers feel to give their goods /services? (
Question used to estimate general reciprocity)
$\square$ All villagers feel very happy $\square$ Only few villagers feel happy $\square$ Most of the
villagers feel difficult □ People try to escape
5.2. How frequently people exchange seeds, breeds, equipments and services in the
village.
□Highly□ Moderately □ Less □ Very less □No
5.3. To what extent people share labor during fertilizing, intercultural operations and
crop harvesting season in the village
☐High☐ Moderate ☐Less ☐Very less ☐No
5.4. Did your family give seeds/ breeds or planting materials to your neighbors during
last year?
□No □1-3 time □4-5 times □ More than five times
5.5. Did your family get any seeds/ breeds or planting materials from your neighbor
during last crop season?
$\square$ No $\square$ 1-3 times $\square$ 4-5 times $\square$ More than five times
6. Proactivity
6.1. This is the time for crop season and need to repair the irrigation canal what you

will do?

□You will go to ask all the villagers to go for repair □You will try to arrange
necessary materials/tools for repair □You will go yourself for repair □You will
wait until others to tell you to go □You will remain indifferent
6.2. To what extent do you agree with statement "All people in the village are interested to work in community development work but no one interested to go in frontline to initiate the work?" (Question used to estimate the leadership proactivity)
□Very strongly agree □ Strongly agree □ Neutral □Disagree □Strongly
disagree
6.3. To what extent do you agree with this statement "People from the community
usually go the government offices to know the support services available for
them"?
□Very strongly agree □Strongly agree □Neutral □Disagree □Strongly
disagree
6.4. To what extent do you agree with this statement "People from the community do
not care about the development activities that are being carried in the village by
different agencies?" (Question used to estimate the civic proactivity)
□Very strongly agree □Strongly agree □Neutral □Disagree □Strongly
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Appendix 3.2 AHP process for weighting six dimensions of social capital

**Step-1:** Pair wise ranking of dimensions (Judgment matrix)

Dimension	Networks	Trust	Collective action and cooperation	Reciprocity	Proactivity	Social norms
Networks	1	1/5	2/3	3/1	3/2	2/5
Trust	5/1	1	5/3	2/3	5/3	5/3
Collective action and						
cooperation	3/2	3/5	1	5/2	3/2	3/5
Reciprocity	1/3	3/2	2/5	1	5/2	3/5
Proactivity	2/3	3/5	2/3	2/5		3/7
Social norms	5/2	3/5	5/3	5/3	7/3	1

**Step-2:** Synthesis of judgments (Matrix A)

Dimensions	Networks	Trust	Collective action and cooperation	Reciprocity	Proactivity	Social norms	Total
Networks	1.000	0.200	0.667	3.000	1.500	0.400	6.767
Trust	5.000	1.000	1.667	0.667	1.667	1.667	11.667
Collective action and							
cooperation	1.500	0.600	1.000	2.500	1.500	0.600	7.700
Reciprocity	0.333	1.500	0.400	1.000	2.500	0.600	6.333
Proactivity	0.667	0.600	0.667	0.400	1.000	0.429	3.762
Social norms	2.500	0.600	1.667	1.667	2.333	1.000	9.767
Total	11.000	4.500	6.067	9.233	10.500	4.695	45.995
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**Step-3:** Calculation of priorities using approximation method (normalized matrix, each cell is divided by respective column total to obtain the values in the cells e.g. 1/11 = 0.091)

			W					Average weight
Dimensions	91 /	2	3	4	5	6	Total	(W)
Networks	0.091	0.044	0.110	0.325	0.143	0.085	0.798	0.133
Trust	0.455	0.222	0.275	0.072	0.159	0.355	1.537	0.256
Collective action and								
cooperation	0.136	0.133	0.165	0.271	0.143	0.128	0.976	0.163
Reciprocity	0.030	0.333	0.066	0.108	0.238	0.128	0.904	0.151
Proactivity	0.061	0.133	0.110	0.043	0.095	0.091	0.534	0.089
Social norms	0.227	0.133	0.275	0.181	0.222	0.213	1.251	0.209
Total	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	6.000	1.000

**Step-4:** Consistency measurement (consistent matrix) A\*W (Each column in step 2 table is multiplied by respective row W)

Dimensions	Networks	Trust	Collective action and cooperation	Reciprocity	Proactivity	Social norms	Total	λ <sub>max</sub> (Total/W)
Network	0.1330	0.0512	0.1084	0.4519	0.3128	0.0356	1.0929	8.215
Trust	0.6652	0.2562	0.2711	0.1004	0.1482	0.1482	1.5894	6.203
Collective action								
and cooperation	0.1996	0.1537	0.1627	0.3766	0.1334	0.0534	1.0793	6.635
Reciprocity	0.0443	0.3843	0.0651	0.1506	0.2224	0.0534	0.9201	6.109
Proactivity	0.0887	0.1537	0.1084	0.0603	0.0889	0.0381	0.5382	6.051
Social norms	0.3326	0.1537	0.2711	0.2510	0.2075	0.0889	1.3049	6.259
	onveta			iano A	Average λ <sub>m</sub>			6.579

Consistency Index (CI) =  $(\lambda_{max}-n)/n-1$ 

Where,

n = number of criteria's under consideration, here 6 dimensions

Consistency Index (CI) = (6.579-6)/(6-1)

$$= 0.1157$$

Consistency Ratio (CR) =  $\frac{CI}{CI_r}$ , Where CI is consistency Index and CI<sub>r</sub> is random value of CI for r criteria. (Here six criteria)

Consistency Ratio (CR) = 
$$\frac{0.1157}{1.25}$$
 (Random value of CI for six criteria is 1.25)  
= 0.0925

CR is acceptable as it is less than the 0.10.

Table Average consistency values for different order matrix and acceptable limit of CR

	Size of the matrix									
	1x1	2x2	3x3	4x4	5x5	6x6	7x7	8x8	9x9	10x10
Random CI value	0.00	0.00	0.52	0.89	1.11	1.25	1.35	1.40	1.45	1.49
Acceptable			< 0.05	< 0.09	< 0.10					
CR										

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**Note:** Using the same procedure questions under each dimension were weighted For detail refer Alphonce (1997)

Appendix 4.1 Household characteristics in the study sites (survey result)

Name of the site	Literacy rate	Employment in agriculture Person/ household	Off farm Employment Person/household	Annual income from agriculture in NRs/household	Annual gross income from vegetable farming (NRs)/household	Annual total income NRs/household
Amargadi	0.56	30 4	0.43	15,428.57	12,807.1	26,014.29
Dipayal	0.66	3	0.13	13,250.00	8,062.5	14,875.00
Geta	0.85	5	0.50	91,250.00	50,000.0	109,375.0
Gurukhola	0.67	4	0.44	17,333.33	6,111.1	33,222.22
Jogbuda	0.78	5	1.00	15,500.00	4,062.5	42,125.00
khalanga	0.69	4	0.63	11,500.00	8,625.0	25,625.00
Malakheti	0.64	5	0.00	55,625.00	16,500.0	57,500.00
Pratappur	0.81	2	0.75	58,125.00	35,625.0	85,825.00
Siddhaswor	0.72	4	0.71	28,571.43	14,000.0	63,571.43
Suda	0.90	2	1.00	29,500.00	19,425.0	59,500.00
Tikapur	0.74	2 4 3	0.58	45,937.50	15,583.3	58,312.50
Bhagwati	0.71	3	0.57	15,714.29	11,428.6	45,000.00
Tilachaud	0.78	7	0.75	44,000.00	19,125.0	66,750.00
Bhatkanda	0.66	3	1.25	43,125.00	35,000.0	97,375.00
Chappari	0.66	3	0.75	19,750.00	19,000.0	53,500.00
Dehimandu	0.79	2	0.25	21,875.00	4,000.0	32,375.00
Kumali Deval Hat	0.59	2	0.29	19,750.00	14,000.0	31,750.00
Dhangadi	0.91	3	0.13	73,500.00	28,500.0	79,375.00
Dasrath Chand						
Municipality	0.78		1.25	15,125.00	8,125.0	77,000.00
Dodhara	0.77	4	0.50	50,000.00	9,125.0	83,250.00
Average	0.73	4- (()	0.60	34,692.90	17,018.8	57,225.00

Appendix 4.2 Household characteristics in the study sites

				0001	
Name of the site	Average schooling year of the household head	Average family size	Average land holding size(ha)	Average irrigated land holding (ha)	Average potential land for vegetable farming (ha)
Amargadi	8.14	6.29	0.84	0.52	0.27
Dipayal	9.37	4.50	0.32	0.31	0.15
Geta	4.75	9.25	1.44	1.16	0.37
Gurukhola	6.77	5.11	0.57	0.18	0.11
Jogbuda	10.37	9.13	1.04	0.78	0.30
khalanga	3.75	5.63	0.90	0.29	0.16
Malakheti	4.00	8.13	1.72	1.09	0.62
Pratappur	5.75	4.75	0.74	0.74	0.28
Siddhaswor	2.57	7.00	1.36	0.29	0.46
Suda	5.25	5.88	1.07	1.02	0.75
Tikapur	9.16	7.58	1.14	0.93	0.43
Bhagwati	9.85	6.43	1.57	0.57	0.89
Tilachaud	3.00	7.88	1.38	1.22	0.35
Bhatkanda	6.62	6.38	0.43	0.18	0.23
Chappari	5.62	6.38	0.54	0.14	0.34
Dehimandu	7.12	5.50	1.01	0.23	0.10
Kumali Deval Hat	7.12	4.75	0.78	0.13	0.16
Dhangadi	5.37	4.38	0.86	0.57	0.43
Dasrath Chand	7.25				
Muncipality	7.25	5.25	2.03	0.29	0.13
Dodhara	8.12	7.75	1.24	1.16	0.46
Average	6.56	6.41	1.04	0.60	0.35

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Appendix 4.3 Food security status in study sites

Name of the site	Enough and sell	just enough	Enough up to nine month	enough up to six month
Amargadi	0.0	14.3	71.4	14.3
Dipayal	12.5	12.5	12.5	62.5
Geta	75.0	12.5	12.5	0.0
Gurukhola	0.0	0.0	33.3	66.7
Jogbuda	12.5	62.5	12.5	12.5
khalanga	0.0	12.5	37.5	50.0
Malakheti	62.5	25.0	0.0	12.5
Pratappur	75.0	25.0	0.0	0.0
Siddhaswor	28.6	0.0	28.6	42.9
Suda	75.0	25.0	0.0	0.0
Tikapur	83.3	8.3	0.0	8.3
Bhagwati	14.3	14.3	42.9	28.6
Tilachaud	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Bhatkanda	0.0	12.5	0.0	87.5
Chappari	12.5	25.0	0.0	62.5
Dehimandu	0.0	12.5	75.0	12.5
Kumali Deval Hat	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Dhangadi	25.0	62.5	0.0	12.5
Dasrath Chand				
Munacipality	12.5	0.0	0.0	87.5
Dodhara	25.0	62.5	12.5	0.0
Total	27.2	24.1	16.0	32.7

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Appendix 6.1 Correlation matrix for socio economic features and dimensional indices of social capital

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Literacy rate of	1						1 50			10	
the household	•										
Off farm employment	.132	1									
Annual total income NRS	.326(**)	.598(**)	1								
Land holding size ha	.140	.136	.300(**)	1 4							
Index of networks	.192(*)	.151	.347(**)	.095	1						
Trust Index	.169(*)	.139	.123	.182(*)	.387(**)	1/\					
Index of collective actions	.230(**)	.142	.367(**)	.099	.437(**)	.315(**)	1				
Index of social norms	.150	.082	.196(*)	.153	.211(**)	.226(**)	.179(*)	1			
Index of reciprocity	.197(*)	.034	.234(**)	.194(*)	.413(**)	.210(**)	.401(**)	.205(**)	1		
Index of proactivity	.135	.090	.162(*)	.109	.175(*)	.031	.253(**)	.202(**)	.172(*)	1	
Education level of the respondent	.102	.059	057	.030	.081	014	.015	.077	.120	.135	1

<sup>\*\*</sup> Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) \* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix 6.2 Level of trust to different category of people in selected sites

		New trust	radius (extende	ed trust radiu	s)	Traditional trust radius								
Sites	Leaders	Business man	Government officials	Strangers	Other caste people	Own caste people	Teachers	Priest	Relatives	Parents	Brothers and Sisters			
Amargadi	0.37	0.54	0.71	0.26	0.49	0.71	0.74	0.69	0.71	1.00	0.86			
Bhagwati	0.49	0.43	0.51	0.46	0.43	0.60	0.60	0.63	0.77	0.94	0.83			
Bhatkanda	0.58	0.40	0.55	0.60	0.50	0.45	0.48	0.28	0.45	0.85	0.68			
Chappari Dasrath Chand	0.50	0.50	0.58	0.40	0.48	0.63	0.58	0.53	0.78	1.00	0.75			
Municipality	0.50	0.50	0.43	0.60	0.50	0.30	0.83	0.73	0.90	1.00	0.95			
Dehimandu	0.58	0.55	0.50	0.55	0.50	0.38	0.53	0.63	0.63	0.95	0.95			
Dhangadi	0.50	0.40	0.43	0.30	0.33	0.53	0.38	0.50	0.60	0.95	0.83			
Dipayal	0.28	0.48	0.40	0.40	0.63	0.53	0.58	0.68	0.83	0.90	0.73			
Dodhara	0.50	0.40	0.65	0.33	0.53	0.68	0.63	0.60	0.78	0.98	0.95			
Geta	0.45	0.43	0.75	0.33	0.35	0.75	0.88	0.53	0.80	1.00	0.98			
Gurukhola	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.56	0.40	0.44	0.53	0.51	0.73	0.98	0.96			
Jogbuda	0.38	0.40	0.65	0.38	0.50	0.58	0.60	0.60	0.65	0.93	0.88			
Khalanga Kumali Deval	0.43	0.58	0.40	0.48	0.45	0.65	0.60	0.53	0.78	1.00	0.83			
Hat	0.28	0.58	0.48	0.28	0.65	0.88	0.50	0.75	0.68	1.00	0.98			
Malakheti	0.43	0.50	0.50	0.45	0.45	0.35	0.53	0.58	0.50	0.65	0.65			
Pratappur	0.25	0.40	0.70	0.28	0.48	0.45	0.78	0.45	0.63	1.00	0.80			
Siddhaswer	0.51	0.51	0.60	0.20	0.46	0.74	0.54	0.71	0.86	1.00	1.00			
Suda	0.33	0.50	0.45	0.28	0.58	0.63	0.53	0.68	0.65	1.00	0.95			
Tikapur	0.25	0.40	0.55	0.28	0.50	0.65	0.68	0.43	0.60	0.93	0.83			
Tilachaud	0.28	0.48	0.63	0.25	0.43	0.63	0.70	0.55	0.68	0.98	0.88			
Average	0.41	0.47	0.55	0.38	0.48	0.58	0.61	0.57	0.70	0.95	0.86			

Measured in five point scale 1 = very less trusted to 5 = highly trusted

Appendix 6.3 Status of different types of network, trust, proactivity, reciprocity, cooperation and general ethical norms in sites

Sites	Thin Trust	Thick Trust	General Cooperation	General reciprocity	Reciprocity of labor	Reciprocity of seeds and breeds	Leadership proactivity	Civic proactivity	General ethical norms	Linking Networks	Bridging Networks	Bonding Network
Amargadi	0.64	0.82	0.97	0.94	0.57	0.46	0.49	0.46	0.75	0.66	0.66	0.83
Bhagwati	0.57	0.79	0.94	0.91	0.46	0.50	0.49	0.69	0.61	0.77	0.66	0.86
Bhatkanda	0.72	0.69	0.75	0.83	0.38	0.41	0.63	0.78	0.84	0.80	0.73	0.85
Chappari Dasrath Chand	0.72	0.59	0.78	0.70	0.34	0.28	0.43	0.40	0.63	0.73	0.58	0.70
Municipality	0.75	0.78	0.85	0.80	0.56	0.56	0.40	0.50	0.91	0.73	0.83	0.83
Dehimandu	0.59	0.75	0.80	0.70	0.56	0.53	0.33	0.58	0.44	0.53	0.78	0.73
Dhangadi	0.69	0.88	0.93	0.80	0.63	0.38	0.35	0.50	0.81	0.88	0.70	0.93
Dipayal	0.56	0.47	0.70	0.80	0.56	0.47	0.50	0.38	0.72	0.68	0.58	0.83
Dodhara	0.56	0.50	0.88	0.78	0.72	0.53	0.45	0.53	0.88	0.68	0.63	0.8:
Geta	0.56	0.78	0.98	0.83	0.56	0.47	0.45	0.58	1.00	0.78	0.65	0.8:
Gurukhola	0.53	0.58	0.98	0.80	0.44	0.36	0.42	0.42	0.50	0.62	0.73	0.62
Jogbuda	0.59	0.81	0.95	0.73	0.63	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.78	0.78	0.75	0.8
Khalanga Kumali Deval	0.63	0.63	0.93	0.88	0.41	0.41	0.48	0.43	0.63	0.80	0.63	0.83
Hat	0.63	0.69	0.98	0.73	0.75	0.72	0.43	0.45	1.00	0.78	0.68	0.8
Malakheti	0.56	0.84	0.93	0.80	0.66	0.41	0.55	0.58	0.81	0.75	0.85	0.7
Pratappur	0.72	0.84	1.00	1.00	0.88	0.81	0.33	0.68	0.78	0.85	0.90	0.9
Siddhaswer	0.64	0.75	0.91	0.80	0.39	0.39	0.43	0.60	0.46	0.71	0.83	0.7
Suda	0.69	0.69	0.83	0.78	0.63	0.53	0.48	0.68	0.84	0.80	0.70	0.7
Tikapur	0.60	0.69	0.85	0.73	0.65	0.58	0.37	0.67	0.75	0.73	0.58	0.73
Tilachaud	0.72	0.78	0.98	0.93	0.44	0.47	0.40	0.50	0.53	0.70	0.80	0.7
Average	0.61	0.71	0.89	0.81	0.56	0.49	0.45	0.55	0.73	0.74	0.71	0.8

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**Appendix 7.1** Correlation matrix for adoption index and social capital expressions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	28	19
Index of networks	1																		
Trust Index	.387**	1																	
Index of collective actions	.437**	.315**	1																
Index of social norms	.211**	.226**	.179*	1															
Index of reciprocity	.413**	.210**	.401**	.205**	1														
Index of proactivity	.175*	.031	.253**	.202**	.172*	1													
Bridging Networks	.736**	.415**	.243**	.029	.347**	.004	1												
Bonding Network	.457**	.220**	.202**	.138	.169*	.212**	.155*	1											
Linking Networks	.351**	.173*	.136	.146	.114	.145	.071	.272**	1										
Thin Trust	.277**	.687**	.257**	.122	.136	.068	.236**	.189*	.183*	1									
Thick Trust	.113	.283**	028	.067	.189*	009	.167*	.099	.025	.009	1								
General cooperation	.261**	.354**	.604**	.095	.333**	.255**	.257**	.282**	.078	.234**	.108								
Leadership proactivity	075	184*	088	.074	236**	.475**	088	045	115	126	025	195*	1						
Civic proactivity	.196*	021	.260**	.070	.297**	.660**	.064	.159*	.005	044	.021	.224**	.143	1					
General ethical norms	.196*	.178*	.240**	.801**	.254**	.239**	.005	.099	.179*	.106	.030	.244**	.065	.006	1				
Trust in extended radius	039	028	.011	.034	204**	017	007	.105	018	108	010	197*	.097	010	045	1			
Trust in traditional radius	.137	.118	.038	.025	.078	051	.189*	.146	.013	.131	027	.018	030	051	.032	.232**	1		
Social capital index	.689**	.692**	.654**	.638**	.571**	.351**	.482**	.361**	.284**	.479**	.191*	.380**	069	.268**	.567**	045	.107	1	
Adoption index	.075	084	.099	.202**	034	011	014	055	.138	083	027	.068	.005	032	.246**	.129	114	.082	1

<sup>\*\*</sup> Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). \* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)

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